In plain language, for everyone. The right locks, in the right places.
The 10 principles below are general and apply to any communication app. Here is what is true of IRIS 3 itself.
| Topic | In IRIS 3 |
|---|---|
| Bridge communication | It is encrypted with the Network Key. The same key must exist on all devices. Change it when the team's composition changes. |
| Channel A | It leaves IRIS 3 for Android's share menu. From there it is protected only as much as the app you picked (SMS, email, etc.). |
| Channel C | It is encrypted end to end. It always sends to a specific recipient or group. The server is the one you set up yourself (see the Server page), and the QR pairing code expires. |
| Storage on the device | Data is stored encrypted on the device. |
| Bluetooth | Pairing with the bridge is done in Android's Bluetooth settings. IRIS 3 connects only to a device you pick from the paired list. |
| Permissions | Bluetooth (bridge connection) and Location (GPS, centring, position sharing). The camera is requested when you scan a QR code. |
| Live position | It is off by default. When you turn it on, the device broadcasts your position to the network at the interval you set. So the position leaves on purpose, towards your team. |
Limits. IRIS 3 is an independent project and we have not published an independent security audit. Channel A is not protected by IRIS 3 since it leaves for other apps. Do not rely on any app for information whose exposure would harm people.
Think of it like your house: a door with a key, a key you do not hand to strangers, and an alarm code you do not shout in the street. App security is the same, only digital. Each principle has a right and a wrong example.
The phone or tablet needs its own lock: PIN, pattern or fingerprint. If someone finds the device unlocked, they do not need to hack anything. They just open the app.
It is like leaving the house unlocked because “the door has a lock”. A lock does not help if you do not close it.
A good app does not write messages, positions and notes as plain text. It writes them encrypted, so they only make sense with the key.
Like a note in a secret code: if someone else finds it, they see gibberish instead of “meet at 6”.
Bluetooth is like speaking loudly in a room: it is heard nearby. Connect only to devices you approved yourself, not the first one that shows up in the list.
You do not answer a stranger in the street, but you talk normally to a friend you know.
GPS tells the app where you are so it can show you on the map. If you choose to share your position with the team, that is your decision. It must not be sent anywhere else without you knowing.
You tell a friend on the phone where you are. You do not shout it into an open microphone.
Every time the app asks for access to something (camera, files, location), there must be a reason you can see. A map app has no business asking for your photos “in case”.
You lend your house key only to someone who really has business inside.
No app is perfect on day one. Someone may find a way to trick it. Updates patch those holes, so install them instead of ignoring them.
You learn your lock opens with a credit card and you change it at once, without waiting to be broken into.
In peer-to-peer two devices talk directly. “End-to-end” encryption goes further: the message is locked on the sending device and unlocks only on the receiving one. Nobody in the middle, not even a server if there is one, can read it.
You hand a sealed envelope straight to the recipient instead of leaving it at a post office that could lose or open it.
After pairing, the communication is locked with a key the two devices agree on. The “but” is what comes before: every Bluetooth device broadcasts an “I am here” signal that anyone nearby can see, unencrypted. Safety depends mostly on whether pairing needs confirmation.
You call out “I am here” and the whole room hears. The talk after you agree is whispered in your own code.
When data passes through a third-party company's server, that company technically gains access, even if it does not look. It may leak, change policy or stop existing. When the server is yours, you decide who connects and where the data stays.
Your own chest at home, instead of a box in someone else's bank: you hold the keys.
No lock is 100% unbreakable. That is why security does not rest on one measure but on several independent ones (“defence in depth”). If a device is lost, you need a plan to change keys and cut its access. The goal is not that nothing ever breaks, but that everything does not break at once through the same crack.
A house with a door, an alarm and a watchful neighbour. If the door is forced, it does not mean they are inside.
The app is available in open testing on Google Play. Download it, try it and tell us what you think.